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Abstract 
 
Globalization or trade liberation has both positive and negative impacts to the market 
participants. In general, freer market can increase efficiency and welfare. The rice 
processor in Delanggu, Klaten shows otherwise. High competition reduces the 
processing margin and result many processor leave the market. We support our 
argument by using a case study of rice processor, the Rice Milling Unit, in Delanggu, 
Klaten. The survey reveals that the margin after free trade decreased to one-fifth of its 
previous level. In addition, high fuel price and limited government support worsen the 
margin.
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1. Introduction 
 This paper discussed the effect of free market on the rice processor by using 
case of rice processor in Delanggu, Klaten one of the main rice producers in Central 
Java. Many studies regarding the market liberalization usually focused on whether the 
international price movement transferred to the domestic market (the law of one price), 
for example Ardeni, 1989; Baffes, 1991 or market integration (Ravallion, 1986; 
Sexton et al, 1991; Palaskas and Harriss 1993; Zanias, 1993; Gardner and Brooks, 
1994; Blauch 1997 among others), the impact on the consumers and producers 
surpluses (Sugiyanto 2001). Also, the vertical price transmission along the supply 
chain from the consumer to the producer level (see for example Brorsen et al, 1985; 
Wohlgenant, 1985; Kinnucan and Forker, 1987; Shroeter and Azzam, 1991; Goodwin 
and Holt, 1999; Prakash 1998; von Cramon-Taubadel, 1999). Many studies related to 
Indonesian market focus on price relationships as well, Alexander and Wyeth, 1994, 
Patunru et.al (2004). Lesser government intervention on market-base rice economy 
has also been debated, a close relation between politics and economics, Timmer and 
Dawe (2007). Should the government stabilize the rice price or ensure food security?  
 
We here focus on how the price movement reduce the margin received by the 
processors or intermediate agents. These agents deal with the processing, transport 
cost, transaction cost, and other rents. Limited number of analysis has been done on 
this issue, for example Osborne (2005), Fafchamps and Hill (2008) among others. 
One reason may be due to the limited data because processors reluctant to disclose 
their cost structure to calculate the margin. In order to answer the question, we 
surveyed representative rice processors in Delanggu, Central Java. We focused on 
how their cost structure, the pricing, the margin, and the change in the marketing 
system after the free from the government market intervention through the rice ceiling 
and floor prices. We found that the rice market liberalization increase the competitive 
pressure to the rice processors. In the past, only local processors were buyers. As a 
consequence they played as an oligopsonistic firms and enjoyed high margin from 
processing rice. After the government freed the movement of rice, many 
buyers/traders entered Delanggu sub district to collect paddy (unhusked rice) right 
from the field. They bring the paddy to their processing plant that may be far away 
from Delanggu sub district. The amount of paddy process within the domestic (sub 
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district) reduced and many of the local processors closed down their plants. The 
existing processors enjoyed limited margin and reduced their activities.  
 
The paper is outlined as follows, the next section outlines the structure of the rice 
processing typically found in Central Java, followed by section three, the market 
structure in general and specific to Delanggu case. Section four discusses the market 
structure specific to Delanggu sub district and discusses the analysis. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. The Rice Processing  
 
The rice processing begins with the harvest of paddy from the rice field. Traditionally, 
women use ani-ani (kind of a knife to cut paddy), now many farmers cut the paddy 
shrub and use thrashers to collect paddy. As figure 1 shows, the next step is drying the 
paddy (unhusked rice). Farmer dries paddy in his/her backyard. The processing in this 
case is the transforming the paddy into the white rice. In the past, farmers use hand 
tools (lesung, alu, and lumpang) to do the processing. Currently, most of the 
processing is done by machine in the rice milling unit (RMU). There are three types 
of RMU technology: the one, two and three-phases of technology. The one-phase 
RMU means only one machine carrying out the breaking paddy shell and cleaning 
from the skin. The two-phase machine has the breaking and cleaning in each machine. 
The three-phase includes the thrashing, breaking, and cleaning in three separate 
machines.  
 
Most of the RMU found in Delanggu are one and two-phase machines (small and 
medium size of RMU). With this type of machine, the quality of rice will not be the 
best because of high broken rice and not so clean (white). Not all of them have drying 
facilities (space). The drying process is highly depending upon the sunshine. Any 
unfavourable weather, as a rainy season arrives on December-March in most areas of 
the Java island, will decrease the quality of rice. Moreover, the paddy lost in the 
process is also high.  
 
The processors of rice (the RMU owner) have drying floor facility, machines, and 
storage. Based on the capacity, small size has capacity lesser than 1 ton paddy 
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processed per hour, medium processes 1-5 tons per hour, and large processes more 
than 5 tons per hour (Dinas Pertanian Tanaman Pangan Kabupaten Klaten). The 
drying floor usually has a concrete, the gravel drying floor has high unhusked paddy 
loss during the drying process.  
 
3. The Market Structure 
 
The market structure of rice processing in Indonesia in general consists of the farmer, 
paddy traders (penebas), and the processors (the owner of the rice milling unit), and 
the rice traders. All of these players may also serve as traders (doing buying and 
selling paddy/rice). In addition there are rice brokers, rice collectors, rice traders, and 
kiosk owners. Farmers play a central role in producing rice, while penebas is the key 
player in connecting farmers with the rice market. 
 
Farmers. Farmers are the forefront in the rice marketing system. They manage rice 
field to produce paddy. To produce paddy, farmers combine seeds, fertilizers, land, 
water, and manpower. In order to have these inputs, farmer may use their own capital, 
borrow from the neighbor/relative, obtain credit from the government, or borrow from 
the traders (penebas). The way the farmer finance the production process determine 
the level of net income the farmer obtain. When the farmer depends highly on the 
Harvest Thrashing Drying Breaking 
Cleaning White rice 
Stem 
Unhusked 
rice 
Rice Broken 
Shield 
Shell 
Pelt 
Figure 1. Processing rice 
 5
penebas, usually they do not have much option in selling their paddy. Thus their 
bargaining position is weak. Such condition still is observed in Central Java (CEPPS 
2001).  
 
Farmers also can process their paddy and keep it in their house. In this case, farmer 
needs the manpower to harvest (usually done by women), transports the paddy home, 
and dries the paddy. They use the rice for their own consumption or sell it to the 
market. In general, around 60 percent of Indonesian family’s lives depend upon 
agriculture sector. More than 50 percents of farmers have less than 0.5 hectares of 
land. They contributed about 15 percents of Gross Domestic Product. Rice is the main 
staple to most of Indonesian. Due to limited production around 13 percent of farmers 
were net rice consumers while 35 percent of them were producers, (McCulloh 2004). 
 
Paddy Traders. Paddy traders are the key to relate farmers and the processors. Many 
places have different names for these players including penebas or makelar (in Klaten, 
Central Java) or pengkulak and tengkulak (in Eastern Java such as in Jember, Kediri, 
Lumajang), CEPPS 2001. In the marketing chain of paddy, the farmers could deal 
with makelar or penebas, the rice milling unit (RMU) owners, or the Dolog agencies. 
These players may have a multiple roles such as the penebas is also the RMU owner 
and they also supplier to the Dolog. In particular, the rice (paddy) processors are some 
times also traders. The main processors in this case are the owner of the rice milling 
unit, RMU. 
 
The penebas is the key player in the village. When the number of penebas is limited, 
they play as an oligopsonist. Often they coordinate and divide the market (the rice 
field area) to ease in setting the procurement price from farmers. Farmers usually use 
only part of the produce for own consumption. There are rural cooperative (KUD) in 
the kecamatan (sub district) level but they do not buy unhusked paddy from the 
farmers. 
 
When the number of RMU owners is high, the penebas can also play as oligopolist. 
They can send the paddy to any RMU they like (especially when he/she used their 
own money to procure paddy from farmers) and lift up the selling price of paddy. 
Such position is inline with the risk that the penebas has to bear which may come 
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from the wrong estimate of volume of paddy collected from the field, transportation, 
and drying that highly depends upon the sunshine. 
 
In Klaten, the paddy traders usually collaborate with the RMU owner in term of 
capital (the traders buy paddy from the farmers and then ship them to the RMU 
storage for the processing) and processing into rice. The next step is clearing account 
between traders and the RMU owner with respect to the paddy procurement cost and 
the cost of processing paddy into rice (transport, drying, milling, and packing). In this 
case, the trader may serve as the owner of paddy such that he/she bears all the risk of 
the low quality of rice or otherwise the RMU owner. Farmers actually may sell 
directly their paddy to the Dolog (the government Logistic Depo) agencies or the 
RMU owner. However, they hold back from doing so due to the strict quality 
requirement and delayed payment.  
 
The Processor, the RMU owner. The history of RMU industry in Indonesia is back 
to the colonial era and up to the early 1950. Most of these were owned by the 
foreigner (Suharsono 1987). In the early 1970s the government high commitment to 
the rice production brought the rice milling industry grew fast. The Bank Indonesia 
(the central bank) supported the industry by distributing subsidized credits. Then, the 
number of RMU in Indonesia jumped from around 5000 in 1958 to 35.000 in 1973. 
 
The need to rise rice production, to manage the flow of rice, to distribute subsidised- 
rice inputs, and to protect farmers induced the government to set up rural cooperative 
(Badan Usaha Unit Desa, BUUD and later on Koperasi Unit Desa, KUD) in 1974. 
The RMU activities then concentrated in these rural cooperatives. The government 
limited the issuance of RMU license to the private. The Bank Indonesia also 
discontinued distributing subsidized credit for the RMU industries. These two policies 
destroyed the RMU industries. Processors that active in the transporting and other rice 
marketing activities survived, especially those who have RMU for their own 
processing and access to Dolog. As aside, information on the RMU industry limited. 
 
In 2001 the number of RMU in Klaten district were 282, consisted of 276 small, 4 
medium, and 2 large in sizes. These RMU industries have license, we can not identify 
how many those without license and the mobile RMU (RMU which attached to a 
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small truck, operated around the village). In addition, not all of the RMU owners have 
a permanent (cemented) drying space that difficult to identify in finding them when 
we visited the village.  
 
Rice Traders.  The rice traders in this case are those who collect rice from the RMU 
and ship them to the central of rice trading such as in Cipinang Jakarta or Bendul 
Merisi market in Surabaya. These traders do not relate with farmers, unless they are 
the RMU owner and penebas. However such high integrated role is difficult to be 
done. Only several RMU owner become rice traders but not the penebas. 
 
There is limited published information about the structure of the rice traders. We only 
recognize that there are big traders that connect the local rice market with national 
(such as from Delanggu Klaten to Cipinang Jakarta), local rice traders, and kiosks. 
Many of them are also supplier to the Dolog/Bulog for national stock purposes. The 
government also has limited intervention on this trading activity. Most of the 
intervention is in the input side of paddy production (mainly at the on-farm activities) 
not the off-farm. As a consequence, these traders lead the marketing of rice in 
Indonesia. Such dominancy strengthen when the Bulog was refrained from 
intervening the market after the Indonesian government reform its role in setting the 
ceiling price of rice and the floor price of paddy in 1997 (after the government signed 
the reformation agreement with the International Monetary Funds, IMF). The traders 
then determine how much rice shipped to a certain market, at what price, and more 
importantly the quality standard of rice.  
 
The market. In general, paddy flows from the farmers to the local traders (penebas) 
that may have rice milling unit. These traders process the unhusked rice into white 
rice. They have storage and drying facilities. The traders sell rice either directly to 
consumers, send it to collectors within the Klaten District, sell to collectors in big 
cities (Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya), or to the Dolog/Bulog (the 
Indonesian Logistic Bureau). Because of the Dolog/Bulog requirement on the quality 
of rice and other bureaucratic difficulties only limited number of the rice processor 
are suppliers to the Dolog/Bulog.  
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In figure 2 we can observe the complexity of the rice marketing: farmers may bring 
all the harvested paddy home, process, and sell it little by little to the small RMU 
owner. Such pattern is commonly observed in Central Java. They may also sell part of 
the harvest to penebas or RMU or sell all of the harvest at a time. 
 
The relationship between the farmer and the small RMU somehow is unique. Because 
of the small size of land, the farmer highly depends upon the small RMU in 
processing their paddy. Farmers never complaint about the low quality of the rice they 
receive from the RMU processor because of old and inefficient machine. Farmer may 
also borrow some money from the small RMU owner. They feel that the low quality 
of rice somehow compensate the ease in obtaining credit. 
 
The small RMU which process paddy of the farmers receive some processing 
payment. This small RMU who buy some of the paddy from the farmer, processes 
them into the rice PK (only broken the rice shell) and sells it to the large RMU. This 
is because many of the small RMU have limited capacity in processing paddy into 
white rice. Lastly, the small RMU process paddy into white rice and sell it into the 
rice market. 
 
 
Farmer 
harvest 
Own  
Consumption 
Sell a Portion 
Sell all Penebas 
Large RMU 
White 
Rice 
Rice 
PK 
Rice market 
Satgas Dolog 
Figure 2 Typical Rice market in Central Java 
Small RMU 
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Many small RMU owners have a close relationship with the large one. Large RMU 
could also be supplier of paddy to the small RMU that reduce the high cost when 
dealing with penebas (compete the penebas offer). Large RMU may also a rice trader 
that the small one can collect their rice for shipping to the national rice market.  
 
Penebas procure paddy from the farmer, sell it to the small RMU or large RMU 
wherever the higher benefits. In many cases, the penebas enjoys some margin both 
from procuring paddy from the farmer and from selling paddy to the RMUs. As 
mentioned, the way the penebas obtain its funding will determine to whom the 
penebas will sell its paddy. However, we still find penebas who sell its paddy to the 
RMU owner who give high price which is different person and not necessarily the 
RMU lender and repay the credit in cash.  
 
The small RMU bargaining position is weak in the above cases. This is because the 
penebas is the only paddy supplier. Unless the RMU also play as the penebas then 
they can obtain some paddy from farmers. It is very unlikely that farmer directly sell 
their paddy to the RMU owner. Even though the small RMU provide credit to the 
penebas they never explicitly sign a contract and set the interest rate. The RMU 
owner expects the side revenue from the pelt (bekatul), shell, and broken rice (menir). 
When the penebas delay the payment they never recalculate the cost of credit (might 
also be difficult). 
 
The large RMU connect with three players at a time: the penebas, the Satgas Dolog, 
and the rice trader in the rice market. The Satgas Dolog is the Dolog/Bulog agencies 
(could be penebas, tengkulak) that work for them in procuring paddy for the national 
rice stock purposes. In most cases, only large RMU supply rice to the Satgas Dolog 
because they able to write contract, bear the delay payment, and have capacity to 
process paddy in a large amount with a stringent standard of white rice set by the 
Dolog/Bulog.  
 
 Satgas Dolog/Bulog. The Satgas Dolog and Bulog are the government bodies. They 
serve the government in implementing price control (the floor and the ceiling price) 
and developing storage to stabilize supply between the harvest season and the distant-
post harvest. In addition, Dolog/Bulog distributes rice to the government officers and 
 10
the military personnel as part of their in kind income. In the past, the government 
through the Dolog/Bulog actively enters the rice market to keep the price between the 
floor price for the unhusked rice and the ceiling price for the white rice.  
 
After 1997, the signing of the reformation agreement with the IMF, the government 
removed the floor and ceiling price and replaced the market intervention scheme by 
setting a highest retail price. In addition, import and export of rice are free. 
Specifically, under the Presidential decree 9/2002, the floor price was replaced by the 
basic price, namely the set price for the Bulog to purchase unhusked rice at its storage 
facilities. In 2005 under the Presidential decree no 2, the government issued the 
government purchasing price (Harga Pembelian Pemerintah, HPP) to replace the 
basic price. Moreover, using Presidential decree no 13 the government state that the 
rice price stabilization policy will be implemented through the varying government 
stock. Thus, it is not the government responsibility to guarantee farmers receive good 
price. 
 
4. Analysis and Discussion 
 
The study located at Delanggu sub district of Klaten, Central Java. Delanggu is the 
center of rice production in Central Java. Compare to other sub districts in Klaten, 
Delanggu rice productivity is the highest (5,96 ton per hectare) while the average is 
5,6 ton per hectare. The size of rice field is only 5 percent to the total rice field in 
Klaten (1576 hectare). However, Delanggu has a technical irrigation that farmer can 
harvest paddy 3 times a year. 
 
 11
 
 
As recorded in 2001, the number of rice processors (the RMU owner) in Klaten was 
282. However, according to Haji Atwal Arifin the head of rice traders association (27 
May 2008), from around 100 RMU owners in Delanggu Klaten, only 10 of them are 
still actively operating. The rest are not clear. Those who are surviving are processors 
that not only milling the paddy but also directly serve as penebas, processing the 
paddy at their own RMU, and selling the rice using their own line of distribution. By 
controlling almost all of the line distribution they can compete with others. He 
explains further that the price difference is only 100 rupiah per kilogram (the rice 
price fluctuate between 5,400 rupiah per kilogram to 5,500 per kilogram in the 
market) but this difference is matter to the buyer. He mentioned that free market is the 
cause of the current situation. 
 
We visited 5 RMUs owners whose machine/business is operating. We noticed them 
by checking whether there are unhusked rice spreading at the drying facilities or the 
machines are running. We drove along the Stasiun Delanggu Street and visited the 
respondent if they are operating. Basically we asked: what kind of marketing 
functions they implement, what the cost structure, what the current market situation 
(the competition, the other processors), and the impact of recent pricing policy on 
their business.  
Delanggu, 
5% area with 
rice 
productivity 
5,96 
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The portrait of Indonesian farmers in producing rice is gloomy. Beras (rice) which is 
produced by small farmer face a stiff competition from Thailand, China, Vietnam and 
the USA. In the last 5 (five) years the average domestic price of rice was around 2,630 
rupiahs per kilogram while those of Thailand was 1,947 rupiahs per kilogram for the 
percentage breaking of 5 % and 1,689 rupiahs per kilogram for the 35%. Opening the 
import pipe will flood the domestic market with Thai rice.  
 
The above pressure also realized by the head of industrial, trade, cooperative, and 
investment of Klaten district (Kepala Dinas Perindustrian Perdagangan Koperasi 
dan Penanaman Modal Klaten, H Mujaeroni SH). He said that the current problem 
was due to the free market of rice or the move to globalization era. Even across the 
regions the moving of rice is very intense. We observe buyers (penebas) enter the rice 
field to purchase paddy from farmers. In Delanggu they process paddy from 
neighboring regions such as Sragen, Boyolali, Purwodadi, Sukoharjo, and other 
regions.  
 
In order to calculate the processing margin we have several assumptions. Firstly, the 
processing 100 kilogram unhusked rice will result 55 kilogram white rice. Secondly, 
only variable cost included in calculating daily profit. Thirdly, the price used is 
slightly lower than the government price because the processor never received the 
government price. The price of unhusked rice used is 2,100 rupiahs per kilogram. We 
average the RMU capacity into 5 ton per day. The margin calculation is reported in 
table 1. 
Table 1. The Average Daily Margin before the free-trade 
 Unit price Total (Rp) Grand total (Rp) 
Rice (kg) 
 
Total Revenue 
 
Unhusked rice (kg) 
Transportation 
Labor 
Fuel 
Bag 
 
Total Cost 
2750 
 
 
 
5000 
1 
50 
40 
275 
4000 
 
 
 
1900 
500,000 
5000 
7000 
925 
11,000,000 
 
 
 
9500,000 
500,000 
250,000 
280,000 
254,375 
 
 
 
 
11,000,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10,784,375 
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Margin    215,625 
 
The Average daily margin after the free-trade 
 Unit price total Grand total 
Rice (kg) 
 
Total Revenue 
 
Unhusked rice (kg) 
Transportation 
Labor 
Fuel 
Bag 
 
Total Cost 
 
2750 
 
 
 
5000 
1 
50 
40 
275 
4300 
 
 
 
2100 
500,000 
5000 
7000 
925 
11,825,000 
 
 
 
10,500,000 
500,000 
250,000 
280,000 
254,375 
 
 
 
11,825,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11,784,375 
Margin    40,645 
 
We observe that the average daily margin decrease from 215,625 rupiah to 40,645 
rupiah (or around one-fifth). Overall, the price of rice (the final output) increased by 
7.5 percent, the unhusked rice increased by 15.79 percent, the margin decrease from 
1.9 percent to 0.35 percent. The above margin received will decrease more if we 
consider we have not included the fixed cost and the payment to the family worker 
(the owner). With such decrease it not surprising that the number of RMU operating 
decreased from hundreds to only about 10 (ten).  
 
The high margin before the free trade was because the RMU and penebas could play 
as oligopsonist. It is widely known in the region that each penebas has his/her areas to 
procure paddy. As the number of local penebas is small, they can make such 
arrangement. With the RMU owner, these penebas have specific relationship, 
especially credit, to enable them pay the farmers. Even then, the penebas enjoy the 
oligopolist, as the number of RMU owners is more than the number of penebas. Still, 
the RMU owner receive high margin from trading rice (around 25% before and after 
the free trade, before the transfer costs) 
 
We could not observe the mobile RMU. This unit may be surviving because of its 
mobility, they can move from one harvest place to the other. Competition from this 
small mobile RMU was also mentioned by the head of rice trader, H Atwal. However, 
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since most of the farmers sell they paddy to the penebas and RMU owner, then the 
pressure may not be high.  
 
The above margin is also sensitive to the fuel price change. Recent change in the fuel 
price also decrease the margin, as the manager  of RMU Sarimulyo explained, the 
increase of fuel price from 3500 rupiah per liter to 7000 per liter decrease the 
processing margin from 50 rupiah ker kilogram to 25 rupiah per kilogram.  
 
Margin from storage also decrease as the rice flow freely from one place to the other. 
In fact, with the opening of the border such margin even lessen because imported rice 
price is lower than that of the domestic rice price. In the past, the storage margin, 
keeping the unhusked rice from the harvest season to the distant post harvest season, 
can reach 1000 rupiah per kilogram but now they less likely to storage the unhusked 
rice. 
 
The movement of penebas, coming from other region, also influence the volume 
processed. It is not easy to procure unhusked rice from within the sub district of 
Delanggu. UD Anugerah for example, reduced its rice process from the average 5 
tons to only 2 tons per day. Other processor, ibu Wemmy the rice trader, mentioned 
that many of the RMU owners that do not have penebas as his/her partner and do not 
have line distribution were closed. On the other hand, UD Sri Mulyo can keep its 
machine running because it has penebas in Boyolali, Sragen, Karanganyar and Klaten 
that have different time of harvest. 
 
Lastly, with the above situation, many RMU owners mentioned that they still have to 
deal with the payment. Many big rice traders often delay the payment and penebas 
often borrow money for procuring paddy from farmers. As a consequence the 
financial cost to the processors increases.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper reports the recent situation of the rice processors in Delanggu, Klaten 
region. We survey from the RMU owner and discuss about what kind of marketing 
functions they implement, what the cost structure, what the current market situation 
 15
(the competition, the other processors), and the impact of recent pricing policy on 
their business. The trade liberalization and other changes in the rice market are not in 
favour to the rice processors. They experience decrease in their processing margin. 
Moreover, the competition from international market and player from other limit the 
number of RMU that surviving. Only those who have a close connection with the 
penebas and serve as the rice trader with their own line of distribution survive. This 
means that large player will survive from the international competition. 
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